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Abstract 
It has been more than 50 years since TINA was first enacted in 1962. In a 
nutshell, TINA requires contractors (often sole-source) to submit “cost or pricing 
data” when they negotiate the price of a contract with the federal government. 
The contractors must certify that the information they provide is “current, 
complete, and accurate.” Failing to disclose truthful information could lead to civil 
or criminal investigation. The intention of TINA is to protect the government and 
taxpayers from being ripped off by better informed contractors. We argue that the 
current TINA practice, despite its good intention, is subject to many unintended 
negative consequences that arise from contractors’ bad incentives. Such bad 
incentives are inherently associated with the current TINA framework. We 
employ an incentive-centric approach to perform an economic analysis of TINA. 
Our analysis indicates that the main flaw of TINA is its failure to address moral 
hazard problem, that is, contractors lack proper incentives to exert their best 
efforts to achieve cost efficiency. In some cases, such as cost-plus contracts, 
where moral hazard is an inherent concern to begin with, TINA fails to provide 
remedies. More detrimentally, in other cases such as fixed-price contracts, where 
moral hazard is otherwise appropriately addressed, use of TINA undesirably 
removes contactors’ incentives to exert effort. Therefore, TINA, in the context of 
fixed-price contracts, is the problem rather than solution. The policy implication of 
this report is that a lax use of TINA in the context of FFP contracts should be 
preferred to a strict use.  Moreover, in a repeated game situation where a 
continuous long-term demand for the product from the DoD is expected, TINA 
waiver should be considered for the early period contracts so contractors can 
truthfully reveal their best-effort cost information. 
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Introduction 
 The federal government obligates approximately $500 billion in contracts 
every year for supplies and services needed for executing its mission (Federal 
Procurement Data System–Next Generation, 2015). The majority of procured 
supplies and services are of a commercial nature, although some are defense-
unique projects for research and development as well as major weapon systems 
acquisition. Regardless of whether the government is procuring commercial-type 
supplies and services or defense-unique systems, the government aims to 
negotiate a fair and reasonable price—fair to both parties and reasonable 
considering the quality and timeliness of contract performance (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation [FAR], 2015). When procuring supplies and services 
readily available in the commercial marketplace, the government relies on the 
forces of market competition to obtain fair and reasonable prices. However, when 
the government procures defense-unique supplies and services in markets 
where there may be limited competition or only one seller, the government relies 
on statutory requirements to ensure a level playing field in negotiating fair and 
reasonable prices with contractors. One such statute is the Truth in Negotiations 
Act (TINA), promulgated in Public Law 87-653. TINA was enacted to enhance the 
government’s ability to negotiate fair and reasonable prices by ensuring that the 
government contracting officer has the same factual information that is available 
to the contractor at the time of price negotiations (Nash, Schooner, O’Brien-
DeBakey, & Edwards, 2007). Advocates of TINA argue that the statute effectively 
levels the playing field between the government and contractor in non-
competitive procurements, but opponents argue that TINA is not only 
administratively burdensome, but also results in negative unintended 
consequences. 
 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the Truth in Negotiations Act 
from an economic theory perspective focusing on contractor incentives under 
different contract types. Our research question asks whether TINA provides the 
right economic incentive to contractors to induce their best efforts under different  
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contract types. This research report is organized into five sections. This 
background section is followed by a discussion on agency theory as it is applied 
to the contract management process, as well as a discussion of the Truth in 
Negotiations Act requirements. Our third section reviews economic literature that 
is relevant to our research question. Our fourth section presents the analysis and 
makes policy recommendations. We conclude in the final section. 
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Agency Theory and the Contract Management 
Process 
 Academic research in contract management is founded on several 
economic and management theories; the most often referred to is agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). Agency theory is 
focused on the relationship between one party (principal) that delegates work to 
another party (agent). Two problems can occur in this relationship: goal conflict 
and risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989). Goal conflict occurs when the goals of the 
principal are not aligned with the goals of the agent, and it is difficult for the 
principal to verify the activity of the agent during the performance of the work. 
The problem of risk sharing occurs when the principal and the agent have 
different attitudes toward risk, thus preferring to take different actions during the 
performance of the work. The focus of agency theory is on determining the most 
efficient contract governing the relationships between the principal and the agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
 A contract between the government and a contractor reflects a principal 
agent relationship. The principal (government) contracts with the agent 
(contractor) to perform a level of effort, such as developing or manufacturing a 
product or providing a service. In this relationship, the government’s objectives 
include obtaining the product or service at the right quality, right quantity, right 
source, right time, and right price (Lee & Dobler, 1971). The federal government 
also has the additional objective of ensuring that the product or service is 
procured in accordance with public policy and statutory requirements (FAR, 
2015). Contractors, on the other hand, pursue the objectives of earning profit, 
insuring company growth, maintaining or increasing market share, and improving 
cash flow, just to name a few. Because of the different and conflicting objectives 
between the principal and agent, each party is motivated and incentivized to 
behave in a specific manner. This behavior includes either withholding or sharing 
information.  
 
 In principal–agent relationships that involve higher levels of uncertainty, 
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which result in higher risk (such as developing an advanced technology weapon 
system), the information available to the government and contractor is typically 
asymmetrical. Agency theory is concerned with the conflicting goals between the 
principal and agent in obtaining their respective objectives and is focused on 
mechanisms related to obtaining information (e.g., about the marketplace, the 
supply or service, or the contractor—to counter the information asymmetry 
problem); selecting the agent (to counter the problem of adverse selection); and 
monitoring the agent’s performance (to counter the effects of moral hazard). 
 
 Thus, how contracts are planned (competitive or sole source), structured 
(fixed price or cost reimbursement, with or without incentives), awarded (based 
on the lowest priced, technically acceptable offer, or the highest technically rated 
offer), and administered (centralized or decentralized, level and type of 
surveillance, use of project teams, etc.) has its basis in agency theory and the 
principal–agent problem. This is reflected in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Agency Theory and the Contract Management Process 
(Rendon, 2011, p. 6) 
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Typically, contract management is discussed from the perspective of the 
buyer, with a focus on the procurement (buying) side of contracting. The six 
contract management key process areas (from the buyer’s perspective) consist 
of procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, 
contract administration, and contract closeout/termination (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). In addition, since government contractors (sellers) also manage contracts, 
the contract management process reflects the key process areas from the 
seller’s perspective. These phases include Pre-Sales Activities, Bid/No-Bid 
Decision-Making, Bid/Proposal Preparation, Contract Formation, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout/Termination (Garrett & Rendon, 2005). 
Since this research is about the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), a government 
procurement statute, only the buying side of contract management is discussed. 
The following is a brief discussion of the contract management buying processes. 
 
1. Procurement Planning involves the process of identifying the supply or 
service that is needed by the requiring organization. This process involves 
determining whether to procure, how to procure, what to procure, how much to 
procure, and when to procure. The procurement planning process includes 
determining and defining the requirement (the supply or service to procure), 
conducting market research, and developing preliminary requirements 
documents such as statements of work, budgets, and schedules (Rendon & 
Snider, 2008). 
 
2. Solicitation Planning as the procurement planning decisions are finalized. 
This process involves formalizing the documents needed to support the 
solicitation of the procurement. It also involves documenting programs. The 
solicitation planning process includes the following: determining the procurement 
method (sealed bids, negotiated proposals, etc.), selecting the contract type 
(fixed price versus cost); developing the solicitation document (IFB, RFQ, or 
RFP); and determining proposal evaluation criteria and contract-award strategy 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
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3. Solicitation is the process of issuing the solicitation documents and 
requesting bids or proposals from interested offerors. The solicitation process 
includes conducting advertising of the procurement opportunity and holding a 
pre-proposal conference, if needed (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
 
4. Source Selection occurs after the bids or proposals are received by the 
buyer. During this process, the proposal evaluation criteria is applied to the 
proposals to select a supplier and award the contract. The source selection 
process includes evaluating proposals and conducting contract negotiations with 
the seller in an attempt to come to an agreement on all aspects of the contract—
including cost, schedule, performance, terms and conditions, and anything else 
related to the contracted effort (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
 
5. Contract Administration is the process of administering the contract once 
awarded. The activities involved in contract administration will depend on the 
contract statement of work, contract type, and contract performance period. This 
contract administration process includes monitoring the contractor’s work effort, 
measuring the contractor’s performance, and managing the contract changes 
process (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
 
6. Contract Closeout/Termination is the process of completing the contract 
and verifying that all administrative matters are concluded on a contract that is 
otherwise physically complete. A government contract can end in one of three 
ways. First, the contract can be successfully completed, allowed to run its full 
period of performance, and then closed out. Second, the contract can be 
terminated for the convenience of the government. Finally, the contract can be 
terminated for default. Regardless of how the contract ends, all contracts must be 
closed out. This contract closeout/termination process includes the final 
acceptance of products or services, processing the final contractor payments, 
and documenting the contractor’s past-performance assessment report (Rendon 
& Snider, 2008). 
  
Given this backdrop of agency theory and the contract management 
process, in the next section, we discuss the Truth in Negotiations Act 
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requirement and how the act is integrated in the contract management 
processes. The major focus of this section is to show how the application of TINA 
within the contract management process addresses the agency theory problems 
related to goal conflict, risk sharing, information asymmetry, moral hazard, and 
adverse selection. 
  
Acquisition Research Program 
       Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 8 - 













THIS PAGE LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK   
Acquisition Research Program 
       Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 9 - 
       Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Truth in Negotiations Act 
Federal acquisition policy requires that contracting officers procure 
supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices 
(FAR, 2015). Fair and reasonable prices can be assured through the use of 
competitive proposals providing price competition, commercial or catalog prices, 
or prices set by law or regulation (FAR, 2015). If these approaches are not 
available in procurement, then the government may request the offeror to provide 
cost or pricing data to be used in negotiating fair and reasonable prices. 
Additionally, the offeror may be required to certify that the cost or pricing data 
provided to the government are current, accurate, and complete as of the date of 
negotiations.  
 
 During the procurement planning process, the government will conduct 
requirements analysis and market research to determine the availability of 
supplies and services that exist to meet the government’s requirements, as well 
as the capability of the market to provide those supplies and services. The 
results of procurement planning will determine if there is a competitive market for 
the required supply or service. Based on the results of the procurement planning 
process, the government will conduct solicitation planning and develop the 
solicitation (e.g., a request for proposal) and advertise the procurement 
opportunity by posting the solicitation on the government-wide electronic portal.  
 
 During the source selection process, the government will conduct a review 
of the proposals and determine the existence of adequate price competition, 
commercial or catalog prices, or prices set by law or regulation. If these are in 
existence, then the government will be able to conduct a price analysis on the 
proposals and there will be no need for requiring cost or pricing data. In this 
case, the TINA requirements will not apply. 
 
 If adequate price competition, commercial or catalog prices, or prices set 
by law or regulation are not in existence, for example, if only one proposal is 
received, then the government may need to conduct cost analysis as part of the 
evaluation of the proposals. This cost analysis may require the offeror to provide 
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cost and pricing data to the government. The FAR defines cost and pricing data 
as follows: 
Cost or pricing data (10 U.S.C. 2306a (h) (1) and 41 U.S.C. chapter 35) 
means all facts that, as of the date of price agreement, or, if applicable, an 
earlier date agreed upon between the parties that is as close as 
practicable to the date of agreement on price, prudent buyers and sellers 
would reasonably expect to affect price negotiations significantly. Cost or 
pricing data are factual, not judgmental; and are verifiable. While they do 
not indicate the accuracy of the prospective contractor’s judgment about 
estimated future costs or projections, they do include the data forming the 
basis for that judgment. Cost or pricing data are more than historical 
accounting data; they are all the facts that can be reasonably expected to 
contribute to the soundness of estimates of future costs and to the validity 
of determinations of costs already incurred. They also include, but are not 
limited to, such factors as— 
(1) Vendor quotations; 
(2) Nonrecurring costs; 
(3) Information on changes in production methods and in 
production or purchasing volume; 
(4) Data supporting projections of business prospects and 
objectives and related operations costs; 
(5) Unit-cost trends such as those associated with labor efficiency; 
(6) Make-or-buy decisions; 
(7) Estimated resources to attain business goals; and 
(8) Information on management decisions that could have a 




Additionally, if the value of the procurement exceeds the TINA threshold 
(currently established at $700,000), the offerors will be required to certify that the 
cost or pricing data are current, accurate, and complete at the time of 
negotiations. This is the essence of the TINA requirement. TINA (10 U.S.C. 
2306a and 41 U.S.C. chapter 35) requires offerors to submit certified cost or 
pricing data if a procurement exceeds the TINA threshold and none of the 
exceptions to certified cost or pricing data requirements applies (see FAR 
15.403). Under TINA, the contracting officer obtains accurate, complete, and 
current data from offerors to establish a fair and reasonable price (see FAR 
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15.403). TINA also allows for a price adjustment remedy if it is later found that a 
contractor did not provide accurate, complete, and current data.  
 
The FAR defines certified cost or pricing data as follows: 
 
Certified cost or pricing data means “cost or pricing data” that were 
required to be submitted in accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and 15.403-5 
and have been certified, or are required to be certified, in accordance with 
15.406-2. This certification states that, to the best of the person’s 
knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data are accurate, complete, and 
current as of a date certain before contract award. Cost or pricing data are 
required to be certified in certain procurements (10 U.S.C. 2306a and 41 




Thus, during the source selection phase of contract management, in situations 
where the government does not have adequate price competition, commercial or 
catalog prices, or prices set by law or regulation, the government relies on the 
contractor’s certified cost or pricing data to negotiate a fair and reasonable price. 
Once negotiations are complete, the contract is awarded. The contract may be 
awarded using a fixed price contract or a cost reimbursement contract. Fixed-
price types of contracts provide for a firm price or, in appropriate cases, an 
adjustable price. Fixed-price contracts providing for an adjustable price may 
include a ceiling price, a target price (including target cost), or both. Unless 
otherwise specified in the contract, the ceiling price or target price is subject to 
adjustment only by operation of contract clauses providing for equitable 
adjustment or other revision of the contract price under stated circumstances. 
Cost-reimbursement types of contracts provide for payment of allowable incurred 
costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. These contracts establish an 
estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds and establishing a 
ceiling that the contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the 
approval of the contracting officer (FAR, 2015). If, during contract performance, 
or even after the contract is complete, the government determines that the 
contractor’s cost or pricing data was not current, accurate, or complete, TINA 
allows for a price adjustment remedy and can recoup any excess costs. 
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During the contract administration phase of the contract, there may be 
instances when the government must modify the requirements of the contract. 
Through the contract changes process, the government may make changes 
within the general scope of the contract to drawings, designs, or specifications; 
method of shipment or packing; or place of delivery (FAR, 2015). Additionally, if 
any such change causes an increase or decrease in the cost of any part of the 
work under the contract, the government will negotiate an equitable adjustment in 
the contract price and modify the contract. Since this contract change will occur 
after the award of the basic contract, the government will not have the benefits of 
adequate price competition in determining a fair and reasonable price. Thus the 
government will need to rely on the contractor to submit cost and pricing data to 
the government, and, if the value of the contract change exceeds the TINA 
threshold (currently established at $700,000), the contractor will be required to 
certify that the cost or pricing data are current, accurate, and complete at the 
time of the contract change negotiation.  
 
 When the contract period of performance is over and the completed 
contract is being closed out, the contractor’s final actual costs may be audited by 
the government. If the government has reason to believe that the contractor’s 
certified cost or pricing data was not current, accurate, or complete, TINA allows 
for a price adjustment remedy and the government can recoup any excess costs. 
 
 As can be seen in the previous discussion, the TINA statute is integrated 
throughout the contract management process and provides the government a 
level playing field with the contractor in negotiating a fair and reasonable price 
without the benefit of price of competition. In these situations, the government 
and contractor may be negotiating either a fixed price contract or a cost 
reimbursement contract. In the next section, we discuss the application of 
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Economic Literature Review 
 
 In this section, we review academic literature that is relevant to 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition and set the foundation for the 
subsequent analyses. We first start with a general description of the unique 
characteristics that underlie the DoD major weapon system acquisitions, and 
then introduce adverse selection and moral hazard concepts. We further 
elaborate on why DoD contracting is subject to both Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard problems, and why, consequently, limiting information rents and inducing 
the best effort naturally become the two objectives for policy makers. We also 
introduce the concept of the “power of incentive schemes” and how it applies to 
various contract types. Finally, non-commitment and the ratchet effect in DoD 
contracting are discussed, along with a brief introduction to the cost padding 
behavior of DoD contractors. 
Unique Characteristics of Major Weapon System Acquisitions 
 Major weapon system purchases are very complicated and unique. Wang 
and San Miguel (2013) argue that “the Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAP) contracting environment is unique in the sense that an MDAP contract is 
typically a sole-buyer-and-sole-seller case, in which market competitive forces 
rarely exist and significant information asymmetry and potential agency problems 
prevail” (p. 6). The major contributing factor to the “sole source” or “near sole 
source” contracting scenario is “the complexity, uncertainty, and long-term 
commitment in major weapon systems” (Wang & San Miguel, 2013, p. 6. Other 
reasons are “the DoD’s need for secrecy, expediency, and/or safeguarding 
human resources” (Wang & San Miguel, 2013, p. 6).  
 The sole-source scenario puts the DoD at an informational 
disadvantageous position relative to the contractor in the contracting process. 
Due to the significant information gap between the contractor and the 
government, the contractor has the intent and ability to extract information rents 
from the government. Moreover, since the effort level of the only capable 
contractor is not observable, contractors’ shirking becomes a legitimate concern.  
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Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
An adverse selection (i.e., hidden information) problem arises when 
contractors have superior information relative to the government. Many times, the 
government is at a loss when it comes to how much a product or a new system 
should cost. The company that provides the quote is at a high advantage when it 
negotiates with the less-informed government. The government usually has to 
take the contractor‘s word on price and quality, especially for a first-time-
purchased product or system.  
Laffont and Tirole (1993) provide a footnote from Robert Keller, the former 
assistant comptroller general of the United States, in regards to adverse 
selection: 
The government negotiator generally is at a disadvantage in trying 
to negotiate, since the contractor knows not only all the facts and 
the assumptions underlying his estimates, the alternatives available 
to him, and the contingent areas, but he also knows the price at 
which he will be willing to accept the contract. (p. 2) 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) define moral hazard (i.e., hidden effort) as 
“endogenous variables that are not observed by the regulator. The firm takes 
discretionary actions that affect its cost or the quality of its products. The generic 
label for such discretionary actions is effort“(p. 1). Effort is hard to observe and 
hence cannot be contracted upon. As a whole, society is lazy and hence 
contractors tend to shirk unless incentives are provided to induce more effort. 
With moral hazard, the information provided by the contractors on their past 
performance and quality of work can be manipulated to make it seem as though 
the company is making its best effort, and some very well might be, but in reality, 
the contractors are shirking. 
In general, DoD contracts are subject to both Adverse Selection and Moral 
Hazard problems, given that significant information asymmetry is the norm, and 
the effort level of contractors is generally not observable. Hence, a benevolent 
government that aims to maximize the whole society’s welfare has two policy 
objectives in mind: limiting undue information rents and inducing cost-saving 
effort. 
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Various Contract Types And Power Incentive Schemes  
Fixed Price, Cost-Plus, and Incentive Contracts  
 There are two major types of contracts: fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts. The two polar cases are firm-fixed price (FFP) and cost-plus fixed-fee 
contracts (CPFF).  
According to FAR 16.202-1, 
A firm-fixed-price contract provides for a price that is not subject to 
any adjustment on the basis of the contractor’s cost experience in 
performing the contract. This contract type places upon the 
contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and 
resulting profit or loss. It provides maximum incentive for the 
contractor to control costs and perform effectively and imposes a 
minimum administrative burden upon the contracting parties.  
FAR 16.306 states: 
A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that 
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated fee that is 
fixed at the inception of the contract. The fixed fee does not vary 
with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in the 
work to be performed under the contract. This contract type permits 
contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great a risk 
to contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum 
incentive to control costs. 
 An FFP contract without TINA addresses the moral hazard problem but 
still suffers from adverse selection. In this type of contract, the contractor is 
motivated to exert the best effort to save on cost and maximize profit. Adverse 
selection, on the other hand, is still a major problem due to contractors’ strong 
incentives to withhold their proprietary information as well as extract information 
rents. Even with market research completed by contracting officers, the Adverse 
Selection problem remains a significant issue.  
 A CPFF contract, in contrast, addresses the adverse selection problem 
better because the reimbursement is based on incurred rather than projected 
cost. However, Moral Hazard becomes the main worry since contractors have no 
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incentive to curb costs. The lack of incentive to curb cost is because that 
contractor’s profit is fixed and any cost savings will be passed on to the 
government as opposed to the contractor.  
 In addition to the FFP and CPFF, there are various incentive contracts that 
lie between the two extreme cases. They are fixed-price-incentive-fee (FPIF) 
contracts, cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts, and cost-plus-award-fee 
(CPAF) contracts. These incentive contracts are intermediate contracting 
arrangements between the two polar types and they typically address both 
Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard, yet neither effectively enough. 
Power of Incentive Schemes 
Various types of contracts introduced in the first section possess different 
power of incentive schemes. Power, in relation to incentive schemes, means the 
extent to which the scheme can motivate effort (see Table 1, reproduced from 
Laffont & Tirole [1993]). 
Table 1. Power of commonly used incentive schemes 
(Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 11) 





(most private regulated 
firms) 
Very High 
(firm residual claimant) 
Fixed price contracts Price caps 
Intermediate 
(cost or profit sharing) 





Cost-plus contracts Cost-of-service 
regulation 
Note. We added highlighting for emphasis. 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) explain that a cost-plus contract has the 
government pay the contractor its realized price, while the fixed-price contract 
has a set limit that the government will pay no matter what performance or effort 
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is executed. They also explain that incentive contracts have the government and 
the contractors share the realized costs.  
  With a fixed-price contract, contractors usually put forth the most effort. 
Although the contractor knows they will receive a fixed fee for their product, the 
more they save on the cost, the more profit they will receive. Thus, fixed price 
contracts are called high power incentive schemes. 
Cost-plus contracts give few incentives to contractors to exert effort and 
hence are labeled as low power incentive schemes. Incentive contracts, as 
intermediate arrangements between fixed-price and cost-plus contracts, are 
intermediate power incentive schemes. 
Table 2 in A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, shows 
that if a contract is fixed-price, the effort is induced 100%. If the contract is cost-
plus, the effort is induced at 0% (Laffont & Tirole, 1993, p. 40). 
Non-Commitment and the Ratchet Effect 
 In DoD contracting, contracts are awarded for one basic year with priced 
options for additional years. This is known as multiple-year contracting. Another 
approach is multi-year contracting. Multi-year contracting is the term describing 
an annual contract that is awarded each year, consecutively. In cost based 
requirements, multiple-year contracts may be used to provide long-term 
incentives to contractors while providing a reliable contract vehicle for recurring 
needs. Awarding multiple-year contracts ensures that the short-term contract is 
guaranteed, and option years are written in the contract for long-term 
commitment. The risk of exercising options is still present, but at a lesser extent 
so as to incentivize the contractor to perform well in order to guarantee an 
additional year. Multiple-year contracts do not require congressional approval or 
guarantee of funds stability, and they can be used for cost reimbursement type 
contracts and fixed price type contracts. The following table shows an example of 
the difference between multiple-year contracting and multi-year contracting.  
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Table 2. Multi-Year vs. Multiple Year Contracting 
(O’Rourke & Schwartz, 2014) 
Multi-year Multiple year 
Issue one or more contracts for each 
year’s procurement of four aircraft. 
After Congress funds the procurement 
of the first four aircraft in FY2015, DoD 
would issue one or more contracts for 
those four aircraft. The next year, after 
Congress funds the procurement of the 
next four aircraft in FY2015, DoD 
would issue one or more contracts for 
those four aircraft. 
 
 
Issue one contract covering all 20 
aircraft to be procured during the five-
year period of FY2015–FY2019. 
Contract award in FY2015, at the 
beginning of the five-year period, 
following congressional approval to use 
MYP for the program, and 
congressional appropriation of the 
FY2015 funding for the program. 
Implementation of the contract over the 
next four years would be completed by 
obtaining funding for each additional 
FY. 
 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) state: 
If the firm performs well (produces at a low cost) early in the 
relationship, the regulator infers that the technological parameter is 
favorable and tries to extract the firm’s rents by being more 
demanding during the regulatory review. The firm has thus an 
incentive to keep a low profile by not engaging in much cost-
reducing activity. To induce the firm to produce at a low cost when 
efficient, the regulator must offer it a generous reward for good 
performance. (p. 45)  
 
Stated equivalently, the lack of commitment from the government naturally 
leads to contractors’ fears of being “ratcheted up” if they reveal their 
lowest possible cost. Being efficient one time would eliminate their future 
rents. Therefore, unless the profit from a one-year contract is sufficiently 
sizable, contractors would choose not to engage in cost-saving activities 
whenever possible. 
 
 The cure to the problem above is straightforward. Laffont and Tirole 
(1993) state: 
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To put the ratchet effect in perspective, recall that, if the two parties 
can commit to a long-term contract at the beginning of their 
relationship, the regulator optimally commits to use each period the 
optimal static contract. That is, it is optimal for the regulator to 
commit not to exploit the information acquired from observing the 
firm’s performance. Commitment is crucial for this outcome 
because the regulator would want to fully extract the firm’s rents 
from the second period on after the firm reveals its efficiency in the 
first period. (p. 376) 
 
Cost Padding  
Cost padding, if not detected and controlled by the government, adds 
unnecessary cost to the government. An example of cost padding includes, but is 
not limited to, incurring excessive costs to the government, such as leisurely 
meetings, first class travel, and business lunches. Other examples are shifting 
overhead costs from commercial business to government contracts and 
engaging in various bookkeeping tricks to manipulate costs. The government 
counters contractor cost padding by requiring certain contractors to be audited.  
 The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has a systemic 
operational cycle that allows monitoring contractor cost driving contractor 
performance. In the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Contract Audit 
Manual (CAM), Chapter 9 discusses the audit of cost estimates and cost 
proposals. Cost padding is a factor in labor cost data. The CAM states:  
The auditor should examine, on a selective basis and in 
cooperation with Government technicians...for the new product. 
When appropriate, contractor personnel should be interviewed to 
ascertain probable significant changes in engineering production 
methods and the effect those changes might have on current cost 
data. When an evaluation indicates that significant technological 
changes have occurred since the cost data was accumulated, 
adjustment of experienced costs is necessary before projecting the 
experience cost pattern. (DCAA, 2014a) 
The manual further explains the contractors’ variances of direct labor cost and 
illustrates how a “guesstimate“ is made and then a “padding“ is added to protect 
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from any unexplained cost. Because of the bookkeeping manipulations, resulting 
guesstimates, and subsequent padding, it becomes a significant challenge for 
the contractor audit to accurately appraise the extraneous cost. Cost padding is 
viewed as being more prevalent in cost-plus contracts, though as we elaborate 
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Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
 As pointed out in the literature review section of this report, defense 
procurement is subject to both adverse selection and moral hazard problems; 
consequently, limiting information rents and promoting contractors’ cost-saving 
effort become the two main policy objectives for the government. 
 
 This section argues that TINA, to some extent, mitigates the adverse 
selection problem by mandating that contractors provide certified cost and pricing 
data that are “current, complete, and accurate” and legally holding them 
accountable. Hence, it is fair to say that TINA helps policy makers achieve one of 
their two policy goals: limiting information rents. 
 The fourth section of this report, however, emphasizes the ineffectiveness 
of TINA. In particular, building on an economic-based, incentive-centric approach 
that investigates contractors’ incentives, we argue that the main flaw of TINA is 
its failure to address the moral hazard problem. In some cases, such as cost-plus 
contracts, where moral hazards are an inherent concern to begin with, TINA fails 
to provide remedies. More detrimentally, in other cases such as fixed-price 
contracts, where moral hazards are otherwise appropriately addressed, the use 
of TINA undesirably removes contractors’ incentives to exert effort. Therefore, 
TINA, in the context of fixed-price contracts, is the problem rather than the 
solution.  
 Based on our arguments, we accordingly make policy recommendations 
at the end of this section. 
Distorted Incentives: Use of Tina with Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Contracts 
 
  In this subsection, we express our greatest concern with TINA. That is, ill-
fated incentives are created if TINA is used with an FFP contract. In the 
following, we use a step-by-step approach to illustrate the problem. 
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1. Background: there is a current policy push toward more use of FFP 
contracts. 
  
Since 2009, support for firm fixed price contracts has been steadily increasing in 
order to limit government risk, reduce cost overruns, and improve contract 
effectiveness (Wang & Miguel, 2013). As such, there has also been a strong 
policy push towards regulation in support of fixed price contracts to be a fix-all to 
the cost overruns faced by the DoD in previous years. Top leaders, including 
President Obama; Robert Gates, former secretary of defense; and Ashton 
Carter, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, all expressed their favor for more use of FFP contracts in DoD 
acquisition. The presidential memorandum issued in April 2009 (Obama, 2009) 
explicitly stated that ‘‘there shall be a preference for fixed-price type contracts.” 
Consequently, more and more DoD contracts prescribe FFP. 
 
Given the more frequent use of FFP in DoD procurement, it has become 
increasingly more important to understand how contractors’ incentives change 
with respect to the enforcement of TINA within FFP contracts. In particular, we 
use a “without and with” approach to demonstrate the unintended negative 
consequences of bundling TINA with FFP contracts. 
 
2. FFP contracts without TINA, despite many weaknesses, are free of the 
moral hazard problem. 
 
Wang and San Miguel (2013) challenge the wisdom behind policy makers’ 
favor toward FFP contracts. In particular, they state, “the notion that fixed price 
contracts are better than cost-plus contracts for limiting cost overruns is 
misleading.” The article further explains that FFP contracts may in fact have 
three negative consequences: (1) fixed-price contracts provide few risk-sharing 
benefits; (2) fixed-price contracts lead to higher government payments; (3) 
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Nevertheless, despite the problems pointed out by Wang and San Miguel 
(2013), FFP contracts do have one appeal: that is, an FFP contract is a high 
power incentive scheme that effectively motivates contractors’ maximum efforts. 
Once an FFP contract is awarded, the contractor relentlessly seeks to reduce 
cost because every dollar saved on cost will directly translate into profit. Stated 
equivalently, contractors under FFP contracts without TINA voluntarily abstain 
themselves from shirking, that is, Moral Hazard is not a problem at all.  
 
3. FFP contracts, with TINA, lose the last benefit of being a high power 
incentive scheme. 
 
Since most of the DoD weapon procurement FFP contracts exceed the TINA 
threshold value, unless a TINA waiver is widely applied, FFP contracts without 
TINA are exceptions rather than norms. Hence, it is important to understand what 
incentives or disincentives are created or removed if TINA is bundled with an 
FFP contract.  
 
One astute observation by Rogerson (1994) is that “TINA cannot force 
defense contractors to reveal the lowest possible cost that they could produce at 
if they exerted an optimal effort. Rather, it essentially tells them that the price 
they negotiate must be close to the cost they actually incur” (p. 68).  
 
Therefore, a contractor under an FFP contract that is subject to TINA has the 
following ill incentive: the fear of being held accountable for any significant 
unfavorable cost discrepancy (i.e., the actual incurred cost is significantly below 
the ex-ante cost estimate submitted to the DoD as the basis for contract fixed-
price) would strongly motivate the contractor to shirk (i.e., reduce cost-saving 
effort) or even engage in cost padding (e.g., by opportunistically incurring or 
allocating more costs to the government contracts), especially when the natural 
state turns out to be favorable.  
 
In the situation above, shirking becomes a dominant strategy because 
working hard introduces disutility to the contractor with the additional risk of being 
penalized by TINA. In the case of a very favorable natural state (i.e., if every 
exogenous factor turns out to be good), if shirking is not sufficient to bring the 
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cost close enough to the ex-ante cost estimate, the contractor will engage in 
opportunistic and hard-to-detect cost padding to ensure the reported cost is 
trouble-free.  
 
To recap, TINA, in the context of FFP contracts, removes the last benefit of 
FFP contracts and literally turns a high power incentive scheme into a low power 
one. Here, the Moral Hazard problem is reintroduced by the misuse of TINA. 
 
4. A Numerical Example 
 
We use the theoretical framework in Laffont and Tirole (1993) to set up a 
numerical example to illustrate the point made in previous sections. A 
contractor’s cost function is specified as follows: 
 
𝑐 = 𝑐(β,e)            (1) 
 
where β is a state parameter (e.g., technology) and e is the effort. One can 
interpret that β is the adverse selection parameter and represents a contractor’s 
private information, and e is the moral hazard parameter.  
 
     Without losing generality, assume the state parameter β has three possible 
outcomes: good, neutral, or bad, with equal probability of occurring.  Moreover, 
the contractor can choose either work hard (e=10) or shirk (e=1). 
 
Imagine the cost function takes the following form: 
 
𝑐 = 𝛽 +
𝛽
𝑒
            
 
Note that the cost increases with β (so β is an inverse indicator of state 
parameter) and decreases with e (effort reduces cost). 
 
Case 1) Good situation: (β=10), with probability 1/3. 
 
𝑐 = 10 +
10
𝑒
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Case 2) Neutral situation: (β=20), with probability 1/3. 
𝑐 = 20 +
10
𝑒
       (3) 
 
Case 3) Bad situation: (β=30), with probability 1/3. 
𝑐 = 30 +
10
𝑒
     (4) 
 It is reasonable to assume that the contractor knows the probability 
distribution of the natural state, whereas the government does not know. We also 
assume that the contractor’s negotiation strategy is to ensure breakeven even in 
the bad situation, and he or she can still shirk. So the contractor will submit $40 
as the cost estimate by equation (4), and the less informed government would 
most likely accept, with TINA’s strings attached, stating that if the incurred cost is 
more than 25% lower than $40 (i.e., below $30), then the contractor is subject to 
a TINA audit.  
 Let’s also assume that this is a one-time static game in which no further 
contract is possible. The contractor tries to maximize its profit. 
 The sequence of actions is as follows: the contractor submits the bidding 
price, accepted by the government, who attaches TINA to the FFP contract. Then 
the natural state reveals, the contractor chooses effort, and finally, the cost is 
incurred. 
 If a bad situation happens, the contractor will choose to work hard (e=10), 
so the cost is $31 by equation (4), a TINA audit is not triggered, and the 
contractor earned a profit of $9. There is no moral hazard problem in this 
situation. 
 In the case of a neutral situation, if the contractor works hard (e=10), his or 
her cost would be $21 by equation (3), which is good in the absence of TINA, yet 
not good when TINA is in place; this is because any cost below $30 would trigger 
a TINA audit. The contractor, knowing this risk, would choose to shirk (e=1), so 
the cost will be $30 by equation (3), which successfully hides the contractor  
under the radar of TINA. In this scenario, the moral hazard problem is created by 
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TINA. 
 What if the most favorable natural state emerges? In that case, if the 
contractor works hard, he or she will incur a cost of $11 by equation (2), which is 
going to raise a big red flag to the government. Therefore, the contractor is going 
to shirk; however, because the natural state turns out to be so favorable, even 
shirking is not enough to mute the alarm of TINA. (Note that shirking in case 1 
would yield a cost of $20, which is below the audit threshold value of $30, and 
hence will trigger the TINA audit.) So what would the contractor do to evade the 
TINA investigation? The contractor will engage in cost padding and artificially 
increase the reported cost to at least $30, so he or she will not get into trouble. 
Now in this scenario, TINA not only created a Moral Hazard problem, but also 
generated bad incentives for defense contractors to engage in unethical and 
opportunistic cost padding.  
Fixing Incentives: from Static to Dynamic Perspective 
1.  One-shot Static Game 
A good starting point is a static situation where no further contract is 
possible. Using the numerical example, the government already paid $40; 
because the contractor can avoid a TINA audit in all three possible scenarios by 
either shirking or cost padding or both, the government payment becomes fixed. 
Therefore, any higher profit of a contractor will lead to a higher social welfare. 
The implication is straightforward: In order to correct the ill incentives created by 
TINA in the context of FFP, policy makers need to undo the bundling, that is, 
remove TINA from FFP, so the FFP is back to a high power incentive scheme.  
2. Repeated game with non-commitment 
In the one-shot static game, when TINA is removed from an FFP contract, 
the contractor is fully motivated to exert the best effort to maximize profit. Since 
no future contract is possible, the contractor is not afraid to reveal private 
information (i.e., the minimum cost that can be achieved through the best effort), 
because there is no possibility for the government to exploit the private 
information revealed against the contractor in the future.  
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However, in reality, the relationship between a typical contractor and the 
government is rarely a one-shot game. Rather, it is better characterized as a 
repeated game with non-commitment from the government. Typically when 
multiple-year contracts are awarded, the government is agreeing to a single-
year-term contract with the option of additional years. Nearing the end of the 
current fiscal year, the government will begin the process of exercising the next 
option year. This decision is a unilateral process that a contractor may consider 
as non-commitment and, in return, the contractor may be apprehensive to share 
true cost or pricing data for fear of being “ratcheted up” in future years. 
 
Stated equivalently, in a repeated game where contracts have one base 
year and option years which can be exercised by the government, a simple 
removal of TINA from a one-year FFP contract may not be sufficient to induce 
the contractor’s best effort. The contractor is in a very vulnerable position in the 
sense that if he or she chooses to reveal private information at the early stage of 
the game, that information may be used against him or her later so no future 
information rents would be possible. As discussed in the literature review section, 
contractors’ fears of being ratcheted up by the government motivates contractors 
to withhold their private information so they can still extract information rents from 
the government in later periods. To recap, a simple removal of TINA from a one-
year FFP contract tends to be ineffective in addressing the Moral Hazard 
problem. 
 
So what is the fix for the lack of incentives? If a one-year FFP contract 
without TINA is not enough to motivate, the government should consider 
multiple-year FFP contracts without TINA. This is especially useful if the product 
is demanded on a continuous basis. The idea is this: Make the reward of 
revealing the best-effort cost big enough that the contractor voluntarily tells the 
government the lowest achievable cost. It is wise to let the contractor win early, 
win big, but win only once. The government, and hence the taxpayers, win in the 
long run and win even bigger. 
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3.  Multiple-years contracts: Numerical example continued 
 
In this subsection, we extend the static, one-shot numerical example to a 
repeated game case. Under some reasonable assumptions, we show that 
government savings can be achieved by fixing contractors’ incentives. 
 
Without losing generality, assume the government needs to order this 
product every year for 15 years. If each year, TINA is attached for 15 annual 
contracts, the contractor will always choose to shirk1 or “shirk and cost padding” 
in order to avoid the TINA audit, as well as keep the information rents for the 
future. Hence, the government will end up paying $600. Alternatively, if TINA is 
removed for every annual contract on a yearly basis, concerns about TINA are 
removed for that year; however, the contractor still worries about the 
consequence of revealing the lowest possible cost under the maximum effort due 
to the non-commitment nature of government contracts. One-year increased 
profit due to effort is too meager to entice contractors to give up their future 
information rents. Thus, a contractor will still withhold effort and choose to shirk.  
 
Without losing generality, assume that a five-year FFP contract is 
sufficient to induce the contractor to exert his or her best effort. Therefore, the 
government commits to pay $40 each year for five years with no TINA strings 
attached. With this commitment, the contractor is fully motivated to work as hard 
as possible, and the lowest possible cost is revealed to the government. The 










∗ 31), will use that information to price the future 10-year 
contracts. Under the assumption that a 10% profit is allowable, the government 
will offer a $23.1 ($21*1.1) annual FFP contract for the remaining 10 years. So 
the total government payment now becomes $40*5+$23.1*10=$431, a savings of 
$169 relative to the original situation. Note that if the time span is longer—say, 25 
years as opposed to 15 years—then the government savings will be even larger. 
 
                                                          
1
 Note that in contrast to the one-shot game, the contractor chooses to shirk even in the bad situation, 
due to the concern of being “ratcheted up” if the lowest possible cost is revealed. 
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4. TINA waivers: A useful policy tool 
 
TINA is effective in deterring outright fraud and “defective pricing,” 
especially on the part of the cost that is verifiable. Hence, we should give TINA 
credit for doing that part right. However, TINA is much less effective at 
addressing the Moral Hazard problem, where one key determinant of the cost, 
namely effort, is unobservable, unverifiable, and not contractible. TINA could 
even become very destructive when it is applied to an FFP contract setting, as 
shown earlier. 
Fortunately, lawmakers do allow TINA waivers, and a shrewd utilization of 
that tool is essential for making better use of TINA. One of the justifications for 
TINA waivers is that “there are demonstrated benefits to granting the waiver.” 
Our analysis in this section detailed the reasoning for the use of TINA waivers. 
Based on our analyses, we recommend the following policy options: 
If an FFP contract is negotiated with a contractor who is unlikely to have a 
continuous contracting relationship with the government for the same or similar 
products and services, then a waiver of TINA should be applied. However, it can 
sometimes be difficult to predict the future of non-continuous relationships until 
after the first year of performance. Additionally, the FAR allows for certain TINA 
waivers under HCA approval.2 
If an FFP contract is negotiated with a contractor who is likely to 
continue to provide the same or similar product to the government 
for years to come, then a multiple-year FFP contract, without TINA 
provisions on defective pricing data, should be offered to motivate 
the contractor’s best effort. Note that in this setting, a multiple-year 
contract is needed. 
 
 
                                                          
2
  Increasing the use of TINA waivers may be a plausible solution if reasonable expectations exist that fair and 
reasonable pricing is already established.  For example, per FAR 14.403-1(c)(4), the HCA may waive the 
requirement for contractors (and lower tiered subcontractors) to provide certified cost or pricing data if such data was 
previously submitted and updated. Allowing for more waivers is an “easy fix” to lowering defective pricing cases, but 
it may not be the most effective in reducing disincentives attached to TINA. Waiving TINA may also subject the 
government to information rents that were previously mitigated. Simply waiving policy when a need for it still exists is, 
in and of itself, an ineffective policy solution. 
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Tina and Cost-Plus and Incentive Contracts 
TINA is less damaging when it is bundled with cost-plus contracts. In 
such contracts, the moral hazard is an inherent concern to start with, and TINA 
does not introduce or solve the problem. Under a cost-plus contract, the 
contractor shirks anyway, regardless of the presence of TINA. To the extent that 
total realized cost is auditable while the various components of total cost are not 
(Lafond & Tirole, 1993), “cost padding” would still be possible. That said, TINA 
does make the verifiable part of the cost more credible and also provides 
disincentives for contractors to engage in outright fraud and defective pricing 
behavior. 
Incentive contracts are basically intermediate arrangements between 
fixed-price and cost-plus contracts. Hence, similar to an FFP setting, but to a 
lesser degree, any cost-saving incentives under incentive contracts would be 
weakened by TINA. The government may change contract vehicles depending 
on the lifecycle of the acquisition program, and it is important to know how TINA 
will affect contracts within each milestone of a program. Throughout the lifecycle 
of the acquisition, a requirement may move along the contract vehicle spectrum 
to take into account new discoveries and established requirements. Because of 
this, TINA should also be a living, breathing provision that takes into account the 
different contract vehicles used in major acquisitions rather than an end-all to 
pricing uncertainty. Because there are certain adverse selection issues and 
moral hazards that are unique to different contract types, acquisition personnel 
need to be aware of which disincentives may be occurring at each contracting 
stage. We leave this to our future research.  
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It has been more than 50 years since TINA was first enacted in 1962. In a 
nutshell, TINA requires contractors (often sole-source) to submit “cost or pricing 
data” when they negotiate the price of a contract with the federal government. 
The contractors must certify that the information they provide is “current, 
complete, and accurate.” Failing to disclose truthful information could lead to a 
civil or criminal investigation. The intention of TINA is to protect the government 
and taxpayers from being ripped off by better informed contractors. 
We hopefully have convinced our readers that current TINA practices, 
despite the good intentions of the act, are subject to unintended negative 
consequences that arise from contractors’ bad incentives. Such bad incentives 
are inherently associated with the current TINA framework. We document both 
strengths and weaknesses of current TINA practices, with an emphasis on the 
latter and in turn generate corrective policy implications. 
One major contribution of our study is to introduce an economics-based, 
incentive-centric approach that focuses on the investigation of agents’ (i.e., DoD 
contractors’) various incentives generated by TINA. This approach, in our 
opinion, can be widely applied to many issues in the DoD acquisition 
environment. The importance of agents’ (in our case, DoD contractors’) incentive 
issues can never be overstated in a DoD procurement setting, as testified by 
Rogerson (1994):  
Defense procurement is unique among regulated industries in the United 
States in that economists have played virtually no role in helping shape its 
regulatory practices and institutions. Perhaps this is due to the barrier to 
entry created by the need to first learn about procurement practices or to a 
lingering distaste for military matters among academics. Whatever the 
reason, this lack of economic input is unfortunate, because many of the 
regulatory and policy issues in defense procurement involve the types of 
incentive issues that economists are very good at analyzing. My own hope 
is that economists are on their way to colonizing this new policy frontier 
and that some of the ideas discussed in this article will play a role in 
shaping policy debates over the next decade. (pp.#-#)) 
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